Policy matters. The long run effects of aggregate demand and mark-up shocks on the Italian unemployment rate

This paper estimates a VAR including labor productivity, real wage and unemployment rate, to identify the dynamic effects of technology, demand, and mark-up shocks, respectively, on the Italian labor market. Identification is achieved by imposing recursive restrictions on the matrix of long run multipliers. Our results show that both mark up and aggregate demand shocks permanently reduce the unemployment rate. Finally, technology shocks do not significantly affect the unemployment rate in the long run. These findings convey important policy implications: expansionary aggregate demand and deregulation policies reducing the mark up permanently decrease the Italian unemployment rate.Jel classification: C32, E32, J29This paper has been produced as part of a CEPR Research Network on New Approaches to the Study of Economic Fluctuations. We would like to thank Marcello DAmato, Mario Forni, Marco Lippi and Antonio Ribba for useful comments. We are also grateful to Bernd Sussmuth for pointing out to us several significant improvements to the paper.First version received: November 2001/Final version received: October 2002     

Acknowledgement of external reviewers for 2000

Editorial Board

Acknowledgement of external reviewers for 2000     

Financial incentives to postpone retirement and further effects on employment — Evidence from a natural experiment

This paper examines the effect of the introduction of permanent benefit reductions for early retirees (i) on the duration until benefit claiming and (ii) on the duration until exit from gainful employment. I estimate discrete time duration models using different error term specifications. Administrative data containing the full earnings history of the individuals are used. Since the reform implementing the benefit reductions was a natural experiment, under some assumptions a causal effect can be identified. The permanent reduction of retirement benefit amounts causes a postponement of claiming benefits by about 14 months and a delay of employment exit by about 10 months on average.     

Testing Alternative Hypotheses in Economic History

This paper employs a statistical technique comparing non-nested quantitative models in order to address an important problem in economic history, namely, the appropriate role of microeconomic models in historical analysis. Discussion proceeds by example. As described in the paper, three research groups have offered explantations of the shift from corn to cotton production in the post-bellum US South but because their research methods are different, it is difficult to evaluate them effectively. This paper suggests a method for comparing them. The method is based on the Neyman–Pearson likelihood ratio and proceeds by focusing on the three groups’ models of crop choice, in turn hypothesizing each model as ‘truth’, and testing all other against it. Though restrictive in its own right, this excercise suggests one data-oriented approach to all-too-common problem of model proliferation in economic history.     

A medium-N approach to macroeconomic forecasting

This paper considers methods for forecasting macroeconomic time series in a framework where the number of predictors, N, is too large to apply traditional regression models but not sufficiently large to resort to statistical inference based on double asymptotics. Our interest is motivated by a body of empirical research suggesting that popular data-rich prediction methods perform best when N ranges from 20 to 40. In order to accomplish our goal, we resort to partial least squares and principal component regression to consistently estimate a stable dynamic regression model with many predictors as only the number of observations, T, diverges. We show both by simulations and empirical applications that the considered methods, especially partial least squares, compare well to models that are widely used in macroeconomic forecasting.     

Are property rights enough?Re‐evaluating a big‐bang claim1

We investigate the claim made by proponents of the big‐bang strategy that the establishment of property rights in an economy in transition creates its own demand for the enforcement of laws to protect those rights. Our model contains a government engaging in activities to accomplish objectives that depend on public support for the enforcement of the rule of law and agents who interpret the level of activities of the government as indications of the government's intent to enforce the rule of law. Agents, using the level of government activities as an input to their decisions, choose whether to support the government's objectives. We establish conditions under which the level of activities chosen by the government maximizes its benefits, and simultaneously induces the constituency to support enforcement of the rule of law. These conditions provide a basis for the argument for the implementation of the big‐bang policy. When these conditions do not hold, however, we show that the level of activities that maximizes the government's benefits may have only a minor impact on support for the enforcement of the rule of law. Two characteristics play an important role in these conditions: the initial level of crime and the types of activities the government chooses to undertake. We present examples showing that the initial level of crime has the more dramatic effect on subsequent support for the rule of law.     

Market makers as information providers: The natural experiment of STAR

Market makers are financial intermediaries who are supposed to provide additional liquidity, but do not have any information-related obligation. This paper studies the unique case of the Italian Stock Exchange, where market makers are also obliged to facilitate information disclosure about the firms they cover. We focus on a group of small/medium capitalization stocks (STAR) that are assigned a designated market maker (DMM) starting from 2001. We show that their liquidity requirements are not binding during the sample periods and that the main impact of DMMs' introduction is due to their obligations on information provision. We find that DMMs' activity as information providers reduces spread and price volatility, the probability of informed trading (PIN), and the adverse selection component of the spread. An event study provides evidence that the information released through DMMs is perceived as useful by market participants.     

Does private-label production by national-brand manufacturers create discounter goodwill?

Discount stores have a private-label dominated assortment where national brands have only limited shelf access. These limited spots are in high demand by national-brand manufacturers. We examine whether private-label production by leading national-brand manufacturers for two important discounters (one hard and one soft) creates discounter goodwill. We estimate a selection model that is based on a sample of 450 manufacturer-category combinations from two leading discounters (Aldi in Germany and Mercadona in Spain), and we show that private-label production is indeed rewarded: national-brand manufacturers that are involved in such practices have a higher likelihood of procuring shelf presence for their brands. Moreover, while powerful manufacturers are intrinsically more likely to obtain shelf presence with soft discounters, manufacturers with less power can compensate for this by producing private labels. No such dependence on power exists for hard discounters.However, not all national-brand manufacturers are equally likely to produce private labels for discounters. We find that national-brand manufacturers are less likely to do so when: (a) they experience more sales growth, (b) it is more difficult to produce high-quality products in a specific category, (c) they invest more advertising support into their brands, and (d) they introduce more innovations. Moreover, a higher price differential relative to the discounter's private labels makes national-brand manufacturers less likely to engage in private-label production for hard discounters.